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U.S. Efforts to Extradite Persons for Tax

Offenses
BRUCE ZAGARIS*

I. INTRODUCTION

Today, a person wanted by the U.S. government for tax
crimes can arrange his or her affairs so that they can depart the
United States. Thereafter, that person can become unavailable by
changing his or her name and even identity, going underground,
obtaining new passports and citizenship, and even arranging to sell
his or her U.S. assets. Prosecution forms an integral part of the
government's enforcement programs in .efforts to enforce its tax
laws. A voluntary tax system depends on the knowledge that the
government can and will prosecute persons who intentionally and
willfully commit tax crimes, even if they flee to other countries.
Obtaining custody of tax criminals implicates extradition and its
alternatives.
This Article discusses extradition for tax crimes. In particular,
this Article focuses on the United States as the requesting state,
and discusses extradition arrangements concerning tax charges
against the offender in the United States. This Article also
discusses the law concerning extradition by the United States,
especially with countries of the European Union (EU). Part II of
this article outlines the applicable U.S. statutory provisions
governing extradition. Part III outlines the applicable foreign
statutory provisions governing extradition. Thereafter, Part IV
considers applicable substantive treaty provisions in U.S.
extradition treaties while Part V discusses applicable procedural
treaty provisions. Part VI summarizes individual U.S. extradition
treaties with respect to tax offenses and related provisions. Part

* Partner, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe, Washington, D.C.; Founder and Editor,
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VII reviews the use of alternatives to extradition. Finally, Part
VIII highlights the trends in extraditing persons for tax offenses.
Normally, proper advice on an extradition request or
indictment requires knowledge of the specific charges, especially
since prosecutors regularly charge related offenses in addition to
tax charges (e.g., false statements, wire fraud, mail fraud, and
money laundering). In addition, many extradition provisions may
apply to a specific case, such as the effect of a request for a
political offense or of pending proceedings for the same offense in
the requested country.
Increasingly, governments are prosecuting persons for tax
crimes. Globalization facilitates the increased use of both legal
and illegal methods to arrange an individual or entity's tax affairs
so as to minimize their tax liabilities.
Traditionally, tax crimes were excluded from the offenses that
states made extraditable through either an explicit provision' or
the omission from the list of extraditable offenses. A requested
state omits tax crimes from an extradition treaty because its
prosecution concerns the state's revenue matters and gives rise to
policy issues and questions about the legitimacy of a state's
financial and tax policies. In some ways, this "revenue rule" is
akin to the political offense exception. Additionally, in some cases
extraditees can challenge the rule of double criminality under the
dual criminality requirement since tax laws are by nature quite
diverse.3
Historically, many experts criticized the refusal of countries to
include crimes of fraud, such as tax fraud, in their extradition
treaties.4 As the differences among world economic systems have

1. Dominique Poncet & Paul Gully-Hart, Extradition: The European Approach, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 277, 295 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(referring to European Extradition Convention, art. 5, Eur. T.S. No. 24); see SATYA D.
BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 198 (1968).
2. In 1983, the Norwegian Government was forced to withdraw an extradition
request to the United Kingdom because tax fraud was not a basis for extradition in the
Anglo-Norwegian extradition treaty. Poncet & Gully-Hart, supra note 1 (citing G.
GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 55 (1991)).
3. Poncet & Gully-Hart, supra note 1, at 277, 295.
4. JOHN B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION
111 (1891).
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the case for including fiscal offenses
declined with globalization,
5
stronger.
become
has
In recent decades, countries have begun to include some 6 or
even all fiscal offenses in extradition and criminal cooperation
treaties. The present trend is to include tax offenses in extradition
treaties. This may be due to the need for better cooperation
among states at a time of revenue pressure, which is partly caused
by the current recession. In addition, free trade, economic
integration, and especially the achievement of the single European
market have facilitated international tax enforcement cooperation.
In addition, global cooperation has also been encouraged by
international organizations, such as the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Commonwealth
Secretariat, and the Organization of American States.
Article 5 of the European Extradition Convention permits
extradition for fiscal crimes when parties agree among themselves,
provided that extradition meets the standard requirements,
including the dual criminality rule. Such fiscal crimes include tax,
duty, customs, and exchange offenses.7
The U.N. Model Extradition Treaty does not exclude fiscal
offenses from extradition. 8 Chapter 2 of the Second Additional
Protocol of March 17, 1978 illustrates the trend to include tax
crimes in extradition treaties. Article 5 takes a more mandatory
form. It provides that extradition will occur, irrespective of any
arrangements between the signatories, whenever the tax crime,
under the law of the requesting state, corresponds to an offense of
the same nature under the law of the requested state. In this
regard, the dual criminality rule has been liberalized so that a
requested state cannot refuse extradition because the law of the
requested state does not impose the same kind of tax or duty or
does not contain a tax, duty, customs, or exchange regulation of
the same type as the law of the requesting state. Hence, a
5. See generally A. N. Sack, (Non-)Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws, In
International Law and Practice,81 U. PA. L. REV. 559 (1933) (discussing the reasons for

non-enforcement due to the diversity among various economic systems).
6. See, e.g., Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their
Common Borders, June 14, 1985, Belg.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 I.L.M. 68, 110 (1991)
[hereinafter Schengen Agreement]. The Agreement only eliminates the exception for
offenses involving the evasion of indirect taxation.
7.

Id.

8. Model Treaty on Extradition, 30 I.L.M. 1407 (1991), reprinted in Bert Swart,
Refusal of Extradition and the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, 23
NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 175 (1992).
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requested state may be obligated to extradite if an act of the same
nature as that underlying the request for extradition would be
punishable in the requested state. Thus, a person who intentionally
evades a tax in the requesting state by giving inaccurate
information in a document or making false statements that serve
as a basis for a decision concerning the amount of that tax, may be
extradited if the same type of deliberate false statements, fraud, or
misleading of tax authorities is punishable under the law of the
requested state, irrespective of the nature of the tax involved.'
Another example that reflects the trend to include fiscal
offenses within international criminal cooperation initiatives is the
trend to conclude special agreements and memoranda of
understanding on mutual assistance and cooperation on fiscal and
financial matters. In particular, the United States has concluded a
series of tax information exchange agreements.1 ° These U.S.
documents generally discuss principal applicable U.S. statutory
provisions governing extradition.
II.

KEY APPLICABLE U.S. STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING
EXTRADITION

Extradition to the United States is substantially affected by
the domestic laws, procedures, institutions, and policies of the
countries from which the United States requests extradition.
Hence, the United States has only limited control over the process.
Three factors affect the ability of the United States to influence
the extradition process. First, treaties with other countries,
especially the applicable extradition treaty, primarily govern
extradition to the United States. Second, diplomatic contacts
between appropriate officials within the country requesting
extradition are important. Here, the State Department plays an
important role, even though sometimes the State and Justice
Departments do not agree on the applicable law and often have
competing values with respect to resolving a particular case. 1
Third, the United States influences the process through direct
9. Poncet & Gully-Hart, supra note 1, at 295-96 (citing Second Additional Protocol
to the European Convention on Extradition, May 17, 1978, art. 2, Eur. T.S. No. 98).
10.

See,

e.g.,

INTERNATIONAL

EXCHANGE

OF

TAX

INFORMATION:

RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS (Richard A. Gordon & Bruce Zagaris eds., 1985) (discussing the
movement towards tax information exchange in the 1980s).
11. In this regard, the Justice Department prioritizes bringing persons to justice
through prosecution while the State Department prioritizes the maintenance of diplomatic
relations and protocols.
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communications and relations between the U.S. Department of
Justice and the foreign officials responsible for handling U.S.
extradition requests."
A U.S. prosecutor seeking the return of a fugitive for
prosecution and a U.S. attorney representing that fugitive can
significantly influence the foreign litigation of a U.S. extradition
request, if they have a good understanding of the laws and
procedures governing extradition to the United States from the
requested country.'3 Hence, a solid grasp of not only extradition
and international criminal law, but also comparative law,
especially comparative criminal law, are important. Normally, at a
very early stage, a U.S. attorney must hire an attorney in the
foreign state who is experienced in both extradition law and the
substantive law in question, such as tax law.
According to 18 U.S.C. § 3192, "the President shall have the
power to take all necessary measures for" the security of a person
extradited to the United States "against lawless violence, until the
final conclusion of his trial for the offenses specified in the warrant
of extradition, and until his final discharge from custody or
imprisonment for or on account of such offenses, and for a
reasonable time thereafter.' 4 This provision has been interpreted
to mean that when a person is extradited to the United States, "he
shall not be arrested or tried for any other offense than that with
which he was charged in those proceedings, until he shall have had
a reasonable time15 to return unmolested to the country from which
he was brought.'
In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3192 authorizes the President to
appoint agents to accept delivery of a person being extradited to
the United States and to transport the person from the
surrendering country to the place of trial within the United States.
In 1970, President Nixon expressly delegated this responsibility to
the Secretary of State.'6 In addition, under § 3192 the President
has authority for a person's care, safekeeping, and security while
the person is in the United States in connection with the
12. MICHAEL ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES 309
(2001).
13. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (1948).
15. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 423-24 (1886).
16. Exec. Order No. 11,517, 35 Fed. Reg. 4, 937 (Mar. 19, 1970). Subsequently the
Secretary has redelegated the authority to the Deputy Secretary and the Legal Adviser
although no formal redelegation has been published in the Federal Register.
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proceedings with respect to which his extradition was granted,
"and for a reasonable time thereafter."
Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. §3193 provides:
A duly appointed agent to receive, in behalf of the United
States, the delivery, by a foreign government, of any person
accused of crime committed within the United States, and to
convey him to the place of his trial, shall have all the powers of
a marshal of the United States, in the several districts through
which it may be necessary for him to pass with such prisoner, so
far as such power is requisite for the prisoner's safekeeping.
III. KEY APPLICABLE FOREIGN STATUTORY PROVISIONS
GOVERNING EXTRADITION
Almost all countries from which the United States seeks
extradition, especially in the EU, regulate extradition by statute.
Like the U.S. statutes relating to extradition from the United
States, foreign extradition statutes ordinarily establish the
procedures by which extradition from such countries occurs.
However, unlike the U.S. extradition statutes, foreign extradition
statutes normally have an important number of provisions that
establish substantive rules governing extradition. Additionally,
some foreign constitutions have provisions affecting extradition
from those countries. For instance, the German and Mexican
Constitutions prohibit extradition of nationals. 7 In the
Netherlands, paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Constitution and
Article 2 of the Extradition Act state that extradition may occur
only pursuant to a treaty. Additionally, paragraph 3 of Article 2
confers on individual persons a right to be extradited only
pursuant to the provisions of an extradition treaty.8 Both the
procedural and substantive extradition laws of a country from
which the United States requests extradition can have a substantial
impact on whether a country will grant extradition to the United
States in a particular case.
The effect of inconsistencies between statutes and an
applicable extradition treaty may be important. In the United
States, if a provision of a U.S. extradition treaty is inconsistent
with a U.S. statute, the one most recently entered into force takes
17. See Michael Plachta, (Non-) Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?, 13
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 77, 109 n.125 (1999).

18. Bert Swart, Extradition, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
NETHERLANDS 85, 93 (Bert Swart & Andrd Klip eds., 1997).

LAW

IN THE
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precedence. Two very different rules of construction typically
apply in such instances.
The normal rule in foreign common law jurisdictions is that a
statutory provision takes precedence over an inconsistent treaty
provision. Hence, as demonstrated by the Sheinbein case, even
though the 1962 U.S.-Israel extradition treaty calls for each
country to extradite its nationals to the other, subsequent Israeli
legislation barred the extradition of persons who were Israeli
nationals on the date of the commission of the requested offense. 9
Similarly, the 1984 treaty between the United States and Ireland
appears to allow extradition for any offense that is punishable
under the laws of both countries by imprisonment for more than
one year. Nevertheless, the Irish Extradition Act of 1965 prohibits
extradition from Ireland for "revenue" offenses. The Irish
provision illustrates the continuing legacy of the "revenue rule."
In civil law jurisdictions, the usual rule is that a treaty
provision overrides an inconsistent statutory provision. Many civil
law countries have provisions at the beginning of their extradition
statutes, which state that those statutes apply only to the extent
that the applicable extradition treaty is not inconsistent.
However, provisions in the constitutions of such countries either
override inconsistent treaty provisions, or effectively disallow the
negotiation of treaties that have inconsistent provisions."
IV. APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE TREATY PROVISIONS
This Part highlights the types of substantive provisions
contained in some or all U.S. extradition treaties and provides a
basic discussion of the scope and operation of those provisions in
relation to extradition to the United States. The substantive
19. For a discussion of the Sheinbein case, see Israel Supreme Court Denies U.S.
Request to Extradite Sheinbein and Israel Prosecution Requests Reconsideration, 15 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 143, 143-146 (Apr. 1999). In a three-to-two decision, the Israeli
Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling and held that Samuel Sheinbein, an
eighteen-year-old charged with killing, dismembering and burning a teenager in
Montgomery Country, Maryland in September 1997, "was a citizen of Israel and could not
be extradited to the U.S."; see also Sheinbein Plea Accepted in Israel, 15 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 415,415-16 (Oct. 1999).

20. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 316 (citing Council of Europe, Expression of Consent
by States to Be Bound by Treaty (1987)).
21. Id. Ultimately the executive branch plays a key role in determining whether its
country will grant an extradition request. For instance, in the Spanish request to extradite
General Augusto Pinochet, Jack Straw, the United Kingdom Home Secretary, in the end
denied the extradition request.
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provisions of U.S. extradition treaties differ widely, and apparently
minor differences in language can result in significant differences
in their operation, especially when those provisions are interpreted
and implemented by foreign courts and officials under their
constitutions, statutes, and general legal principles. Thus, each
extradition case must be viewed in terms of the applicable treaty,
the domestic law of the country from which extradition is sought,
and prior interpretations of similar provisions in that country. In
addition, due to the effect that the domestic law of a requested
country may have on extradition to the United States, it becomes
important to consult counsel from the requested country who are
competent to render advice on extradition matters.
A. Obligation to Extradite
The basic obligation to extradite is contained in all U.S.
extradition treaties in reciprocal terms. The obligation to extradite
is subject to the conditions specified in the treaty. The first article
of every U.S. extradition treaty contains the requirement of the
signatory countries to extradite persons charged with,22 or
convicted of, extraditable crimes in the requesting country who are
"found" in the territory of the country from which extradite is
requested.
Modern U.S. extradition treaties condition the obligation to
extradite in three ways. 23 First, all extradition treaties concluded
after 1960 provide either that the obligation to extradite is "subject
to" the conditions established by, or described in, the remainder of
the treaty, or that the signatories extradite fugitives to each other
"in accordance with," "pursuant to," or "under" the conditions or
provisions of the treaty. Second, the obligation to extradite only
relates to extraditable offenses by, or in accordance with, the
treaty. Third, a requested state must only extradite for offenses
committed in the territory of the requesting state and for offenses
committed outside the territory of the requesting state in
circumstances detailed by the treaty.

22. When the United States is the requested state, its jurisprudence does not require
the existence of a formal charging instrument in the requesting state, as long as the
requesting state complies with the evidentiary and documentary requirements of the
treaty. In re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1982).
23. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 66-67.
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B. Definition of ExtraditableOffenses
The definition of "extraditable offenses" is important in
extradition treaties. The extradition laws of many countries limit
extradition to a list of specific offenses and types of offenses, or
bar extradition for certain types of offenses." Since the statutory
laws of such countries normally take precedence over inconsistent
treaty provisions, the scope of offenses and types of offenses for
which these countries can grant extradition may be narrower than
the definition of extraditable offenses contained in the applicable
treaty. Hence, if a question arises whether the extradition laws of
such a country allow extradition for a particular offense covered
by the applicable treaty, the current extradition laws of that county
must be consulted.
The extradition laws of many countries impose a dual
criminality requirement on extradition from those countries.
Hence, when a foreign country's treaty with the United States is
silent or ambiguous with regard to dual criminality, the country
may still impose that requirement. The requested state normally
looks to see if the underlying conduct for which the requesting
state makes its extradition request is equivalent to conduct
covered by an offense in the requested state.
Many of the countries with which the United States has
concluded treaties that define extraditable offenses as requiring
dual criminality, do not have general conspiracy statutes similar to
18 U.S.C. § 371. Hence, those countries agreed to include a treaty
provision that creates an exception to the dual criminality rule and
makes conspiracy an extraditable offense as long as the offense
that was the object of the conspiracy is an extraditable offense. 6
When both the United States and a country from which it requests
extradition are parties to one of the multilateral conventions
concerning transnational crime, the offenses encompassed by
those treaties automatically become extraditable offenses under
the extradition treaty in force between them.27

24. See Extradition Act, No. 17, pt. 2 (11-13) (1965) (Ir.), reprinted in MICHAEL
(2d ed. 1995).
25. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903). For instance, before the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Factor v. Laubenheiner, 290 U.S. 276, 282 (1933), the Court inferred
such a dual criminality requirement from "general principle[s] of international law."
26. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 2(4)(b), 31 U.S.T 5059,
5062.
27. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 321.
FORDE, EXTRADITION LAW IN IRELAND 111, 114
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C. FiscalOffenses as Extraditable Offenses
Some extradition treaties allow extradition to the United
States for tax offenses, such as tax fraud, tax evasion, violations of
customs laws, and violations of exchange control laws. Despite
such allowances, a country from which the United States requests
extradition for a fiscal offense may not be able to grant extradition
for a tax offense.28 First, a requested country may only allow
extradition for offenses listed as extraditable offenses in its
extradition statutes. If a country's statutes take precedence over
its treaties and the statutes do not list the requested offense as an
extraditable offense, the requested country cannot grant
extradition. Second, a requested country's extradition statutes
may expressly prohibit extradition for fiscal offenses. 9 If a
country's statutes take precedence over inconsistent or ambiguous
treaty provisions, the requested country cannot grant extradition
for fiscal offenses. Third, if the applicable treaty has dual
criminality and minimum punishment requirements, the requested
country may not be able to grant extradition because: (1) the act
that is the subject of the request would not violate its criminal laws
in converse circumstances; or (2) the corresponding offense under
its laws would not be punishable for the requisite minimum period.
The same result may occur if the applicable treaty is silent or
ambiguous with respect to dual criminality, but the laws of the
requested country require dual criminality.30
As mentioned in the discussion of extradition for fiscal
offenses in individual U.S. extradition treaties, many treaties
provide for extradition for offenses that may include tax crimes.
Several treaties also list exchange control offenses as extraditable
offenses.3 Some recent U.S. extradition treaties explicitly provide
that an offense will be extraditable if it relates to taxes, customs
duties, currency control, and import and export of commodities,
whether or not the laws of the requested state provide for the

28. See, e.g., Extradition Act, No. 17, pt. 2 (13), reprinted in FORDE, supra note 24, at
114.
29. Id.
30. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 322; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 585-88 (3d ed. 1996).
31. E.g., Treaty on Extradition, June 22, 1972, U.S.-Den., art. 3(24)(c), 25 U.S.T.
1293, 1298. At present, these provisions do not apply because the United States has no
exchange control laws. Hence, the United States would not be able to extradite due to
lack of dual criminality.

2003]

U.S. Efforts to Extradite Personsfor Tax Offenses

663

same kinds of controls on currency or the import or export of the
32
same kinds of commodities.
Many treaties that provide for a list of extraditable offenses
include the following: "[f]raud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor,
trustee, director, member, or public officer of any company, or
fraudulent conversion ...

[o]btaining money, valuable security, or

goods, by false pretences; receiving any money, valuable security,
the same to have been stolen or
or other property, knowing
33
unlawfully obtained.
In a 1999 case involving an extradition request from Chile for
a Chilean national charged, inter alia, with fraudulently obtaining
refunds of the Chilean Value Added Tax (VAT) and with evading
payment of that tax, fraudulently obtaining export subsidies, and
filing false documents with the Central Bank of Chile in
connection with the tax refund applications, a U.S. District Court
found those charges were extraditable and covered by the
following provisions in the 1900 extradition treaty. "Fraud or
breach of trust by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee or other
person acting in a fiduciary capacity, or director or member or
officer of any company, when such act is made criminal by the laws
of both countries and the amount of money or the value of the
'4
property misappropriated is not less than two hundred dollars."
Notwithstanding the differences between U.S. income tax (and
even U.S. sales tax) and the Chilean VAT, the court reasoned that
the Chilean tax offense constituted the extraditable crime of fraud
under the treaty.35

32. E.g., Extradition Treaty, July 10, 1996, U.S.-Pol., art. 3, S. TREATY DOc. No. 10514 (1997); Extradition Treaty, Mar. 4, 1996, U.S.-Trin. & Tobago, art. 2(6), S. TREATY
DOc. No. 105-21 (1997); Extradition Treaty, July 25, 1997, U.S.-Zimb., art. 2(3)(c), S.
TREATY DOc. NO. 105-33 (1998). These provisions appear to follow the provisions of the
Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Eur. T.S. No. 98.
33. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 47 Stat. 2122 reprinted
in Treaties and Other InternationalAgreements of the United States of America 1749-1949,

at 482-90 (Charles 1. Bevans, ed.) (1968) (extending the applicability of the Treaty to
Palestine and Trans-Jordan). The treaty was extended to many of the former U.K.
colonies and lasted for quite a few years between the United States and a number of
former colonies.
34. In re Extradition of Feliciano Palma Matus, 784 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
35. Id. at 1055-56 (finding that the fraud, as defined in the treaty, covered fraud
against the government).
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D. Defining Jurisdiction
1. Extraditability of Offenses Committed Outside the United
States
With one exception, all U.S. extradition treaties in force
obligate the requested country to grant extradition if the requested
offense was "committed within the jurisdiction" of the requesting
country. This could be interpreted as referring to the competence
of the court of the requesting country to try the alleged offender
for the requested offense. Historically, the United States has
interpreted the term "jurisdiction" in this context to mean
"territory."3 6 The nature of prosecutions for income tax violations
normally enables the United States, as the requesting country, to
show that income tax offenses by U.S. tax residents are committed
within the United States.37 However, a noncitizen and nonresident
with minimum or no contacts with the United States may be able
to argue successfully that any alleged tax crimes were not
committed within U.S. jurisdiction.
Common law countries interpret the term "jurisdiction" more
narrowly than civil law countries. Hence, civil law countries would
appear to be more likely to grant extradition to the United States
with respect to offenses committed outside U.S. territory than
would foreign common- law countries.38 However, the extradition
laws of many civil law countries impose a reciprocity requirement
on extradition from those countries. In addition, some countries'
extradition laws require them to prosecute, rather than extradite,
with respect to crimes committed wholly or partly outside the
United States if the United States would not be able to
reciprocate.3 9

36. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 322-23. For background on territorial jurisdiction and
its extensions, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 30, at 295-345.
37. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 323.
38. See Swart, supra note 17, at 100. States may refuse extradition if the requested
state would, in an analogous situation, not be able to prosecute the offender or enforce a
judgment against him or her. This is often referred to as double criminality in concreto.
This means that the requested state could refuse extradition if it would, in similar
circumstances, not be able to prosecute or punish a person because it would not have
jurisdiction in the matter.
39. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 324; e.g., Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy,
art. 4, S.Treaty Doc. No. 98-20 (1984), treaty on Extradition and Cooperation in Penal
Matters, Apr. 6, 1973, U.S.-Uru., art. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 10850.
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2. Extradition of Nationals of Requested Countries
Common law countries ordinarily extradite their own
nationals to the United States. 0 In contrast, civil law countries
generally refuse to extradite their nationals. 4' However, at least
two U.S. treaties with civil law countries, Italy and Uruguay,
preclude either party from refusing extradition solely on the basis
of nationality. The U.S. treaty with the Netherlands precludes
either country from denying extradition solely on the basis of
nationality if there is a prison transfer treaty in force between the
parties. U.S. treaties with Colombia and Bolivia preclude either
party from refusing extradition solely on the basis of nationality in
certain specified circumstances. Even Colombia has started
extraditing its nationals.42 The majority of post-1960 extradition
treaties between the United States and civil law countries require a
requested country that denies extradition on the basis of the
requested person's nationality to submit the case for prosecution
in its own courts at the behest of the requesting country. Civil law
countries generally have jurisdiction to prosecute their nationals
even for crimes committed outside their country. Trial procedures
and rules of evidence in civil law countries often enable these
countries to try the accused, whereas trial procedures and rules of
evidence in common law countries often make prosecution in lieu
of extradition impractical.4 ' However, extremely complex cases
are impractical to try. Thus, even if the United States were to
indict a foreign person or company for criminal tax and related
violations, the foreign country may find it impractical to try the
case, despite having jurisdiction based on the nationality of their

40. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 325; BASSIOUNI, supra note 30, at 588; Sharon A.
Williams, Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescriptionand the Death Sentence as Bases for
Refusing Extradition,62 REV. INT'L REV. PENAL L. 259 (1991).

41. Article 1.1 of the Extradition Act of the Netherlands precludes the extradition of
Dutch nationals. Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, U.S.-Neth., art. 1.1, S. TREATY DOc.
No. 97-7. However, Article 5 of the Penal Code gives the court jurisdiction over crimes
perpetrated by Dutch nationals abroad. Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, U.S.-Neth., art.
5, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 97-7. Traditionally, the Dutch prefer to prosecute Dutch
nationals in the Netherlands to extraditing them. Swart, supra note 17, at 107.
42. Plachta, supra note 17. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, Colombia Extradites Alleged
Cocaine Capo to the U.S., 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 11, 11-12 (Jan. 2002)

(Colombia extradited Colombian national Alejandro Bernal to the United States on
cocaine trafficking charges).
43. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 325. Fn. 5. See also, Bruce Zagaris, Oregon Trial Court
Denies Defense Motion to Reverse Waiver, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 138, 138-40

(Apr. 2003) (discussing the Longo case).
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defendant, unless its own revenue and/or other policies were at
stake."
Moreover, all post-1960 U.S. extradition treaties, 4 and a few
older ones, expressly prohibit the United States from reextraditing a person to a third country who was extradited to the
United States, except under the same conditions that would allow
the United States to prosecute the person for an offense
committed prior to his or her extradition for which he or she had
not been extradited.46
E. Retroactive Effect of Extradition Treaties
Sometimes questions arise as to the retroactive effect of an
extradition treaty. For example, does the treaty apply to an
offense committed prior to its entry into force? Does the treaty
apply to acts that would not have been an offense in the requested
country on the date of commission, but which would have become
an offense in the country prior to the date the United States
requested extradition? Does a current or prior treaty apply to a
request made after the entry of the new treaty, but where the
offense occurred when the prior treaty was in existence? When
questions regarding retroactivity arise, either the treaty will answer
those questions or they must be resolved in accordance with
domestic laws and precedents of the requested country.47
The defense of lapse of time or statute of limitation often
exempts an extraditee from extradition for where prosecution or
punishment is precluded due to lapse of time. This exemption
from extradition is usually referred to as barred by "lapse of time,"
prescription, or statute of limitation. Most treaties and laws
concerning extradition contain similar provisions. Some treaty
provisions also prohibit extradition where punishment or

44. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Court Denies U.S. Government Weiss Resentence
Motion Despite Austrian Conditions, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 402 (Oct. 2002)
[hereinafter Austria Turns Over Weiss]; Bruce Zagaris, Austria Turns Over Weiss to U.S.
on Fraud Charges, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 348 (Aug. 2002); Bruce Zagaris,
Austria Denies Extradition to U.S. Due to Human Rights Considerations, 17 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 458 (Nov. 2001). After denying extradition to the United States

and starting the prosecution of relator Sholam Weiss, the Austrian Government changed
its position and extradited him, apparently due to the complexity of the case, the expense
of trying him, and the government's lack of interest in the underlying charges.
45. E.g., Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. 12, 28 U.S.T. 227 (1976).
46. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 329-30.

47.

Id. at 86-88, 326.
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enforcement of penalty is barred by the law of the requesting state
or at least would be barred by the law of the requested state.4"
Importantly, countries vary in the application of the treaty or
national law provisions on retroactivity. The requested state may
consider the case as if the crime had been committed in the
requested state and apply its own statute of limitation to
determine whether prosecution would be precluded. If prosecution
is barred, the country will deny extradition.49 For example, the
European Convention on Extradition provides that "[e]xtradition
shall not be granted when the person claimed has, according to the
law of either the requesting or the requested Party, become
immune by reason of lapse of time from prosecution or
punishment."5 ° The U.S. government takes the position that unless
enforcement specifically precludes retroactive application, such
treaties are interpreted to cover offenses committed prior to their
entry into force.
F Principleof Speciality
According to the statutory requirement of specialty codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3192, the United States or a state of the United
States is not allowed to prosecute a person extradited to it for an
offense committed prior to surrender and for which the requested
country had not agreed to extradition, until the person has been
afforded a "reasonable" opportunity to leave the United States.
All U.S. extradition treaties now in force have a specialty
provision. 2 Hence, if a requested country extradites Mr. Y for
making a false statement on his tax return, the United States
cannot prosecute him for assault and battery. In many cases,
however, the United States prosecutes the person in a superceding
indictment for crimes arising out of the facts of the indictment.
The best way to limit the scope of prosecution is to make the
48. Extradition, 6 Whiteman DIGEST § 16, at 859.
49. BASSIOUNI, supra note 30, at 609.
50. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 10, Eur. T.S. No. 24,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enTreaties/Html/024.htm (last visited Sept.
21,2003).
51. See Cleugh v. Strakosch, 109 F.2d 330, 335 (9th cir. 1940) (discussing the
interpretation of extradition treaties); Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234, 237 (2d cir. 1977)
(citing Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F.Supp. 856, 864 (D.Conn. 1959)), affd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960); United States ex rel. Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d
955, 956-57 (2d cir. 1927), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 769 (1927).
52. For a fuller discussion of the rule of specialty, see ABBELL, supra note 12, at 32839; BASSIOUNI, supra note 30, at 429-85.
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extradition order very clear and limited. There is ample litigation
due to ambiguities about the extradition order. 3
Some courts try to discern whether the requested states would
have objected to the court's assertion of- jurisdiction to try the
defendants for the offense in question. The best method,
however, is for the court to require the prosecution to make the
inquiry whenever the court determines the extraditee has raised
the issue in a meaningful way."
G. Evidentiary Considerations
1. Quantum of Evidence Required for Extradition of Person
Charged in the United States
A majority of U.S. extradition treaties provide that the
surrender of a requested person will occur only upon such
evidence of criminality that, according to the laws of the place
where the person is found in the requested country, would justify
arrest and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had been
committed there. Such provisions require a requested country to
apply its own arrest and prosecutorial standards in order to
determine whether the United States has provided sufficient
evidence in connection with its extradition request.
2. Seizure and Surrender of Evidence and Fruits of Offense
Every U.S. extradition treaty in force has a provision
authorizing a country from which the United States requests
extradition to seize and surrender evidence and fruits of the
offense for which extradition is requested. These provisions discuss
53. See, e.g., United States v. Billman, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1657 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that clarification of the degree permitted prosecution for mail or wire fraud);
United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 764-69 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that prosecution
and conviction following extradition did not violate principles of dual criminality or
specialty); United States v. Kahn, 993 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the doctrine
of specialty was not satisfied because Pakistan did not unambiguously agree to extradite
Kahn for the specified count); United States v. Merit, 962 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the United States adhered to the doctrine of specialty by limiting prosecution to those
offenses found extraditable by the Requesting State); United States v. Ledher-Rivas, 955
F.2d 1510, 1519-21 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the United States complied with terms of
the extradition treaty).
54. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1962).
55. See ABBELL, supra note 12, at 389-90, (citing United States v. Gallo-Chamorro,
48 F.3d 502, n. 7 (lth Cir. 1995) (stating that the United States violated the specialty
doctrine by giving Pinkerton instruction to the jury after the Columbian government
expressed that it did not have a comparable legal concept)).
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the scope and content of the ability to conduct a search and seizure
pursuant to an arrest made due to an extradition request and will
determine the extent to which a requested state will seek, seize,
and surrender property.
In addition, the constitution, statutes,
and practices in the requested state may be important in terms of
the requested state's actual practice. Since an extraditee may
possess money related to an alleged tax crime, the United States,
as the requesting state, will want a requested state to protect its
interests with respect to search, seizure, and surrender of evidence
and/or fruits of the offense. It may be practically difficult, however,
to determine whether any property in the hands of an extraditee is
the fruit of a tax crime.
H. Mitigating Factors to Refuse Extradition
1. Effect of Requested Offense Committed Within Territorial
Jurisdiction of the Requested Country
Several post-1960 U.S. extradition treaties expressly grant the
requested country discretionary authority to refuse extradition
when the requested offense is committed, at least in part, within its
territorial jurisdiction."
In the absence of that provision, a
requested country always has the authority to prosecute the
offense itself, thereby precluding subsequent extradition to the
United States. The laws of some countries, especially civil law
countries, impose an obligation on them to prosecute any offense
committed within their territory.
2. Effects of Age, Health, and Other Humanitarian
Considerations
A significant number of post-1960 U.S. extradition treaties
have provisions that consider a requested person's age or health,
or other humanitarian considerations. The British decision on the
Pinochet case illustrates the use of such considerations to deny
extradition. 58 The question that normally arises is whether the
56.

E.g., Extradition Treaty, Nov. 13, 1994, U.S.-Phil., art. 15, 1994 U.N.T.S. 279, 292-

93.
57. See Extradition Treaty, July 13, 1983, U.S.-Ir., art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 10813
[hereinafter U.S.-Ir. Extradition Treaty].
58. Britain Frees Pinochet, 16 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 697 (Apr. 2000); Andrew
Parker, et al., Formally Freed, Pinochet Takes Flight, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 2000,
at 1. British Home Office Minister Jack Straw declared on March 2, 2000 that the ninetyfour-year-old Pinochet was not fit to face trial after suffering brain damage caused by
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requested state should refuse extradition if it believes there are
special circumstances relating to a requested person's age, health,
or other personal condition that would make the extradition
incompatible with humanitarian considerations.
When a requested state is a party to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, counsel for the extraditee may challenge the extradition
to the United States on various humanitarian grounds, especially
the potentially inhumane conditions of imprisonment or inhuman
punishment'9 that the extraditee would face if extradited to the
United States."' The extraditee's ability to raise defenses on
various humanitarian grounds has increased in the aftermath of
the U.S. detentions of persons classified as "enemy combatants"
since the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001, and the U.S.
denial of detainees' access to counsel and courts.61
3. Other Treaty Provisions Affecting Extradition to the U.S
At least three U.S. extradition treaties with Western
European countries (Denmark, Norway, and the United
Kingdom) have a provision that provides that extradition may be
refused on any other ground specified by the law of the requested
country. 6' Hence, interested persons must scrutinize an actual or
potential extradition request to any of these countries to
determine the effect of their extradition laws on request.63
V. APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL TREATY PROVISIONS

Whereas U.S. statutes regulating extradition from the United
States have a relatively limited effect on extradition procedures,
strokes the preceding autumn. Thus, Straw dismissed extradition requests from Spain,
Belgium, France, and Switzerland.
59. See Austria Denies Extradition to U.S. Due to Human Rights Considerations,17
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 458 (Nov. 2001) (denying extradition due to inhumane
punishment in the United States); Austria Turns Over Weiss, supra note 43, at 348; 18
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 348; Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Court Denies U.S. Government
Weiss Resentence Motion Despite Austria Conditions, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 402
(Oct. 2002).
60. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 341-42; BASSIOUNI, supra note 30, at 832-33.
61. Joel Brinkley, Report Says U.S. Human Rights Abuses Have Eroded Support for
Efforts against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at Al.
62. Extradition Treaty, June 22, 1972, U.S.-Den., art. 7, 25 U.S.T. 1295; Extradition
Treaty, June 9, 1977, U.S.-Nor., art. 7, 31 U.S.T. 3619; Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972,
U.S.-U.K., art. V, 28 U.S.T. 227.
63. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 343.
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the laws of other countries typically have a significant impact on
the procedures governing extradition to the United States, partly
because they often contain substantive rules concerning
extradition from these countries. Due to the importance of foreign
procedural laws in regulating extradition to the United States,
persons involved with a potential or actual extradition request by
the United States should be aware not only of the procedural
provisions of the applicable treaty, but also of the procedural
provisions of the foreign country's extradition laws. The nuances
of a requested country's extradition procedures may not be readily
apparent on the face of its extradition statutes and the applicable
treaty.
A. Notification of Decision on Request for Extradition
Extradition treaties provide for the nature and extent of a
requested country's obligation to notify the United States as a
requesting country of its decision on whether to grant extradition.
Many of the recent treaties require the requested state to inform
the requesting state of the reasons for any partial or complete
denial of extradition.
On request, the requested state must
provide copies of pertinent judicial decisions.
B. Request for Person Chargedin the United States
The extradition laws of most U.S. treaty partners specifically
regulate the procedures governing the manner in which extradition
requests must be made, the way in which the requested state must
proceed, the form and contents of such requests, and the evidence
in support of them.
In practice, the United States never starts an extradition case
in a foreign country without first making either a formal
extradition request or a request for provisional arrest to the
requested country. The United States will not submit a formal
extradition
• 61 request without the prior approval of the Department
of Justice, which then delegates the responsibility to the Office of
64. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, June 9, 1998, U.S.-S. Korea, 1998 U.S.T. LEXIS 168,
art. 11(2); European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 10, Eur. T.S. No. 24,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm (last visited Sept.
21, 2003).
65. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 613 (1997)
(Role of the Office of International Affairs in Foreign Extradition Requests), available at
http: // www.usdoj.gov / usao / cousa / foia-reading-room / usam / title9 / crm00613.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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International Affairs (OIA) and the Department of State. The
Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence
(L/LEI) coordinates the State Department and OIA's
responsibilities. The formal request itself is always made through
diplomatic channels, usually by a diplomatic note from the highestranking U.S. diplomatic or consular officer in the requested
country to the foreign minister of that country.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual contains the procedures to which
federal and state prosecutors in the United States must adhere in
requesting the extradition from a foreign country of an individual
who has been charged or convicted of an offense in the United
States. The OIA plays an important role in advising prosecutors
on the formal and practical aspects of successfully preparing an
extradition request.
Although some common law countries have detailed and rigid
evidentiary requirements on evidence submitted by countries
requesting extradition, civil law countries, especially European
countries, generally impose less rigid requirements on evidence in
support of foreign extradition requests. For instance, most civil
law countries do not require the use of first-person affidavits of
witnesses. These lax requirements simplify the work of U.S.
prosecutors. 68 Sometimes, inexperienced or hurried prosecutors
may overlook some elements of the contents of an extradition
request.
While OIA attorneys often catch omissions and/or
defects before they transmit the extradition requests, their
enormous volume of work does not always permit detection of
problems in proposed extradition submissions.

66. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 612 (1997)
(Role of the Department of State in Foreign Extradition Requests), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov / usao / eousa / foiareading__room / usam / title9 / crm00612.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
67.

E.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 9-15.210

(1997) (Role of the Office of International Affairs), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
usao/eousa/foia reading__room/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm#9-15.210 (last visited Sept. 21,
2003); Id. at 9-15.240 (1997) (Documents Required in Support of Request for Extradition),
available at http: // www.usdoj.gov / sao / eousa / foiareadingroom / usam / title9 /
5mcrm.htm#9-15.240 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
68. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 608 (1997)
(Affidavits Establishing the Crime and the Fugitive's Identity), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov / usao / eousa / foia-reading-room / usam / title9 / crm00608.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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C. Request for ProvisionalArrest and Detention
Extradition treaties allow for provisional arrest and detention
of fugitives pending receipt of formal, fully documented
extradition requests. This is due to the ease with which an
accused can flee and the fact that requesting countries cannot
prepare and submit formal, fully documented requests on short
notice.
The extradition treaties describe the method and conditions
for making a request; the required contents of a request; the action
required of a requested country (the United States); the
notification of action taken by a requested country; the length, and
method of computing the length, of the period of provisional
detention. Further, the extradition treaties also describe the effect
of release from provisional detention based on the failure of a
requesting countr0Y to make a formal, fully documented request in
a timely manner.
Unlike U.S. extradition statutes, most foreign extradition
statutes expressly regulate the substantive and procedural
requirements governing provisional arrest. Many provisions in
these foreign statutes merely supplement the conditional arrest
provisions in the treaties between the foreign country and the
United States and are consistent with the statutory terms. In case
of inconsistencies between the statutory and treaty provisions, the
treaty provision ordinarily will take precedence in civil law
countries and the statutory provision in common law countries.7'
D. Surrenderof Requested Person
Most U.S. extradition treaties are silent with respect to the
manner of surrendering a person who has been found extraditable.
However, the majority of post-1960 treaties, especially many of the
most recent ones, provide that the place and time of surrender is to
be determined by agreement of the parties.72 Sometimes, the
requesting and requested states disagree on the mode of
surrender. For example, a disagreement occurred between Brazil
and Mexico when Brazil surrendered Gloria Trevi, the pop star
who became pregnant while detained in Brazil and was befriended
69. Extradition Treaty, June 14, 1983, U.S.-Jam., art. 10, 1983 U.S.T. LEXIS 419.
70. Id.
71. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 316, 351.
72. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, June 9, 1998, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 11(3), 1998 U.S.T.
LEXIS 168.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:653

by some Brazilian legislators. Brazil intended to transport Ms.
Trevi by commercial flight, accompanied by a member of the
Brazil's Congressional Human Rights Commission. Mexico
insisted upon a private plane without such an escort. Mexico
apparently was concerned about the potential adverse publicity
the case would garner and the disapproving Brazilian legislators
who would dominate the press coverage.
E. Documentation
1. Legalization of Extradition Documents
The substantial majority of pre-1960 U.S. extradition treaties
do not have provisions that regulate the manner in which
documents supporting extradition requests should be legalized in
order to be admissible in extradition proceedings in requested
countries. In other words, they do not specify how to authenticate
a judgment, sentence, or arrest warrant that serves as the basis for
an extradition request.7 4 Countries from which the United States
requests extradition under such treaties can be expected to
interpret these requirements in different ways.75 The great majority
of post-1960 treaties have provisions that generally regulate the
procedure for providing documentary evidence in admissible form
for purposes of extradition proceedings in requested countries.76
Formal requirements can also impose difficulties in
submitting legal documents to courts. For instance, in an
extradition case for a tax crime in a European civil law country,
explanations of U.S. jurisprudence have to be accompanied by a
duly authenticated copy of the actual decision by the court. In
73. Bruce Zagaris, Brazil Extradites Gloria Trevi to Mexico on Sex Abuse Charges, 19
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 43 (Feb. 2003).

74. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, Aug. 11, 1874, U.S.-Ottoman Empire, art. 5,
T.S. No. 270. This convention requires a copy of the sentence of a convicted person from
the court in which he may have been convicted, "authenticated under its seal, and an
attestation of the official character of the judge by the proper executive authority, and of
the latter by the minister or consul of the United States or of the Sublime Porte (an official
of the Ottoman Empire mentioned in Article V of the extradition treaty), respectively." If
the person has merely been charged with a crime, it calls for "a duly authenticated copy of
the warrant for his arrest in the country where the crime may have been committed, or of
the depositions upon which such warrant may have been issued." Id.
75.

ABBELL, supra note 12, at 347.

76. E.g., Extradition Treaty, May 29, 1970, U.S.-Spain, art. 10, 22 U.S.T. 737, "In the
case of a request emanating from the United States they are signed by a judge, magistrate
or officer of the United States and they are sealed by the-official seal of the Department of
State and are certified by the Embassy of Spain in the United States." Id.
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many cases, such documentation was kept in a warehouse, with
other decades-old decisions. A party that needed to obtain copies
of court decisions had to physically search among the indexes and
case files. In some cases, it was impossible to find decisions that
were many decades old and these decisions still had to be
legalized. In such a case, a court will normally accept an unofficial
copy of the decision accompanied by an explanation of how the
U.S. case-reporting system handles unofficial decisions. Fulfilling
legalization requirements for foreign courts can be timeconsuming and expensive, and may also require much advance
preparation.
2. Request for, and Provision of, Supplementary Documentation
U.S. extradition requests to non-English-speaking countries
and all supporting documents must be translated into the language
of the requested country pursuant to either a provision in the
applicable treaty or established practice.77 Each extradition treaty
with a non-English-speaking country requires that all documents
in support of extradition be translated into the language of the
requested state. 78
The great majority of post-1960 extradition treaties have
provisions, based on Article 13 of the European Convention on
Extradition, explicitly authorizing a requested state to request
additional documentation in circumstances in which the executive
authority or a court of the requested country finds the
documentation submitted by the United States deficient. These
provisions authorize a requested country to request additional
documentation and allow it to set a reasonable period for the
submission of additional documentation. The need to supplement
an extradition request may have consequences adverse to the
requesting state because the court may be reluctant to continue to
detain an extraditee. Further, pre-1960 treaties may not expressly
authorize an extension of the period of provisional arrest and
detention.79 Some U.S. extradition treaties allow a requesting state
to renew its request for the same person for the same offense if the
77. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 9-15.300
(Procedure in the Foreign Country) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foiajreading-room/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm#9-15.300 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
78. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 10(5), 31 U.S.T. 5059;
Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, U.S.-Neth, art. 9(5), S.Treaty Doc. No. 97-7.
79. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 349-50.
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accused is released due to deficiencies in its extradition
documents. 8°
Indeed, because of the technical differences between tax
crimes in the United States and other countries, especially
between tax evasion and tax fraud, Continuing Criminal
Enterprises, 8' and Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO),82 U.S. extradition requests should detail the legal and
factual elements for these offenses.83 If the requests lack sufficient
specificity, then the requested state's court, defense counsel, or the
requested state itself may raise the defects. As a result, requesting
state (e.g., the United States) may experience a delay, or even
worse, a denial in its request.A
E. Simplified Extradition or Waiver of Extradition
In many cases where a foreign country arrests a person
pursuant to a U.S. extradition or provisional arrest request, the
arrested person may want to go to the United States as soon as
possible to resolve the matter. The arrestee's voluntary and
prompt return to the United States in those circumstances is likely
to increase his chances of release on bail pending trial, and lighter
sentencing should he be convicted. 85
No U.S. extradition treaty that entered into force prior to
1980 facilitates the surrender of a person who does not want to
contest his extraditability. The surrender of a person can be
expedited, even in the absence of a treaty provision explicitly
authorizing it in many countries, especially European countries.
Many European countries have amended their extradition laws to
simplify the surrender process in such instances. 86 Modern U.S.
80. C.f Extradition Treaty, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 15(2), 32 U.S.T. 1485
(allowing a requested state to request additional evidence and fix a time limit for its
submission). A person arrested must be released if the additional evidence or information
is not sufficient or is not received within the period specified by the requested state; but
such release does not bar a subsequent request in respect of the same offense. But see
Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 12, 31 U.S.T. 5059 (allowing a requested
state to request additional evidence, but silent on the implications of such a request).
81. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1984 & Supp. 1998).

82. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
83. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL

RESOURCE MANUAL

9-15.2410

and 9-605 (1997) (Prosecutor's Affidavit), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foiareadingroom/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm (last visited Sept. 21,2003).
84. See also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. International Cooperation Against Transnational
Organized Crimes, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1402, 1425-30 (1998).
85. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 163-64, 351.
86. Id. at 12, at 352.
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extradition treaties have detailed provisions on simplified
extradition.87
A person arrested for extradition to the United States who
wants to waive extradition should know that, in the absence of a
provision to the contrary in the requested country's treaty, the
specialty provision of that treaty will not protect him if he waives
extradition. Rather, he will not have been extradited, but merely
consensually surrendered, to the United States.&
In a number of cases, the extraditee, prior to waiving
extradition and specialty, is not brought before a judge or
magistrate and is not informed of his rights. For instance,
extraditees who are wanted for capital offenses and wish to return
to the United States from Mexico, have been interviewed by U.S.
law enforcement officials. Several extraditees have alleged that
the U.S law enforcement officials only told them the positive
aspects of returning to the United States, including avoiding a long
and difficult stay in very inhospitable Mexican jails. These officials
have allegedly neglected to tell them of Mexico's refusal to
surrender persons to countries in circumstances in which the death
penalty may apply.89 Hence, the use of waiver or simplified
extradition in cases where the decision is not open, informed, and
transparent raises important issues about the fairness of the
process and may lead to further litigation and undermine the
political support for simplified extradition.90
F. Representation of U.S. Requests Before Foreign Courts
The United States, as a requesting country, would want the
advice and assistance of knowledgeable attorneys in a requested
country to ensure that its extradition request and supporting
documentation meet the requirements of the extradition laws of
the requested country and the applicable treaty, as interpreted by
87. Extradition Treaty, June 9, 1998, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 16, 1998 U.S.T. LEXIS 168.
The treaty provides: "[i]f the person sought consents to surrender to the Requesting State,
the Requested State may surrender the person as expeditiously as possible without further
proceedings, to the extent permitted under its law. In such cases, Article 15 of this Treaty
shall not apply." Id.
88.

Id.

89. These allegations were raised in State of Oregon v. Christian Michael Longo,
(Lincoln County, Or. Cir. Ct. 2002) (No. 016441) (involving a charge of aggravated
murder) and in the Santa Barbara County Public Defender's complaint at California v.
Nicolas Vasquez Romero, (Santa Barbara County, Cal. Super. Ct. 2002) (No. 1074348 and
1074262), a murder case.
90. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 166-67.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:653

the courts of that country. The United States finds it helpful to
have its request represented in the courts of the requested country
by local attorneys. Finding and retaining private local attorneys
with expertise in extradition matter is difficult and expensive. As a
result, the substantial majority of U.S. extradition treaties entering
into force since the start of the twentieth century require the
requested country to provide advice and assistance, and where
permitted, representation free of charge.91
An important issue regarding the advice-and-assistance
obligation arises in extradition requests between the United States
and twenty-three former British colonies, including several small,
sovereign Caribbean countries. One problem is that the 1935 U.S.U.K. extradition treaty does not create an obligation to provide
legal assistance with extradition requests. 92 Another problem that
arises in these countries, especially the small Caribbean countries,
is that there is often a shortage of experienced attorneys to
prosecute effectively extradition requests, so that the United
States must hire outside attorneys to prosecute those requests.
These countries are critical to successful international tax
cooperation because many of them have strong international
financial service sectors and persons accused of tax crimes are
often found in the Caribbean.
VI. INDIVIDUAL U.S. EXTRADITION TREATIES WITH RESPECT TO
TAX CRIMES

U.S. extradition treaties concluded prior to 1970 do not
permit extradition for fiscal offenses (e.g., tax evasion or exchange
control) other than those that permit extradition for some customs
offenses, or directly or indirectly authorize extradition for
smuggling. 3 In mid-1970s, however, an important policy shift
occurred in the United States and other countries,94 which made
fiscal offenses extraditable.

91. ABBELL, supra note 12, at 352-53. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, June 9, 1998,
U.S.-S. Korea, art. 18(1), 1998 U.S.T. LEXIS 168. It provides, "[t[he Requested State shall
advise, assist, appear in court on behalf of the Requesting State, and represent the
interests of the Requesting State, in any proceedings, arising out of a request for
extradition." Id.
92. Extradition Treaty, December 22, 1931, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 47 Stat. 2122.
93. E.g., Extradition Treaty, June 18, 1962, U.S.-Braz., art. 2(29), 15 U.S.T. 2093.
94. E.g., Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition,
Mar. 17, 1978, art. 2(1), Eur. T.S. No. 98.
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Since the 1970s, all U.S. extradition treaties (except the new
treaties with Switzerland and Ireland), 9 adopt the "straight dual
criminality" or "straight dual criminality for federal offense"
methods for defining extraditable offenses. They authorize
extradition from the United States for fiscal offenses to the extent
that the requested offense meets the dual criminality requirement.
Additionally, many of the treaties using the list method for state
offenses plus the straight dual criminality method for federal
offenses cite willful tax evasion as an extraditable offense.9 6
Several of the treaties also list exchange control offenses as
extraditable offenses.9 7 Some recent U.S. extradition treaties
explicitly provide that an offense will be extraditable if it relates to
taxes, customs duties, currency control, or import and export of
commodities, whether or not the laws of the requested state
provide for the same kinds of controls
on currency
or the import
•
• •
98
or export of the same kinds of commodities. At least one
extradition treaty authorizes the requested state to refuse
extradition for offenses in connection with taxes, duties, customs,
and exchange control if its competent executive authority
"determines that extradition for any such offense would be
contrary to the public police or other essential interests of" that
country.
Clearly, most OECD governments and many other
governments will include tax offenses in their extradition
arrangements.
Most regional organizations that engage in
arranging the preparation of extradition treaties that are opened

95.

Extradition Treaty, Nov. 14, 1990, U.S.-Switz., art. 3(3), 1990 U.S.T. LEXIS 2211.

Sometimes a treaty partner's internal legislation may take priority over the provisions of
the extradition treaty and may preclude such state from fulfilling its obligations under an
extradition treaty. Section 13 of the Irish Extradition Act of 1965 forbids extradition for

tax offenses and takes priority over the apparent inclusion of such offenses by the dual
criminality definition of extraditable offenses in the treaty. See FORDE, supra note 23, at
114.
96.
97.

E.g., Extradition Treaty, Sept. 14, 1979, U.S.-Colom., 1979 U.S.T. LEXIS 199.
E.g., Extradition Treaty, June 22, 1972, U.S.-Den., art. 3(24)(c), 25 U.S.T. 1293.

At present, these provisions do not apply because the United States has no exchange
control laws. Hence, the United States would not be able to extradite due to lack of dual

criminality.
98. E.g., Extradition Treaty, July 10, 1996, U.S.-Pol., art. 3, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 10514; Extradition Treaty, Mar. 4, 1996, U.S.-Trin. & Tobago, art. 2(6), S. TREATY DOc. No.
105-21; Extradition Treaty, July 25, 1997, U.S.-Zimb., art. 2(3)(c), S. TREATY DOc. NO.
105-33.
99. Extradition Treaty, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 1(b), 32 U.S.T. 1485.
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for signature and ratification include tax offenses by optional
protocol.
A. Austria
Article 2(1) of the U.S.-Austria extradition treaty' °° defines an
extraditable offense as one punishable under the laws of both
parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of more
than one year or by a more severe penalty. Article 2(3) provides
that, if extradition has been granted pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2,
it shall also be granted for any other offense requested, provided
that all other requirements for extradition are met.
Article 2(4) provides flexibility to enable extradition in three
specific situations. Two of these situations are of particular
interest to persons wanted by the United States for tax offenses.
An offense is to be considered an extraditable offense whether or
not the laws of the parties categorize or describe the offenses in
similar terms.
B. The Bahamas
Article 1 of the U.S.-Bahamas extradition treaty' °' obligates
the signatories to extradite to each other, pursuant to the
provisions of the treaty, persons whom the authorities in the
requesting state have charged with or found guilty of an
extraditable offense. Article 2 provides that an offense is an
extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws of both
signatories by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one
year, or by a more severe penalty. At present, tax offenses do not
appear to exist in the Bahamas. Until now, the Bahamas has
opposed international criminal cooperation for tax offenses.
However, any person residing in the Bahamas who is a fugitive for
tax crimes (especially a U.S. citizen) would have to consider the
proximity of the Bahamas to the United States, the
disproportionate power of the United States to the Bahamas, and
the occasional kidnapping by U.S. law enforcement officials of
fugitives in the Bahamas.
C. Barbados
100. Extradition Treaty, Jan. 8, 1998, U.S.-Aus., 37 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force Aug. 1,

1998).
101. Extradition Treaty, Mar. 9, 1990, U.S.-Barb., S. TREATY DOc. NO. 105-20.
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Barbados and the United States signed an extradition treaty
on February 28, 1996, which is now in effect.0 2 Article 1 obligates
the signatories to extradite to each other, pursuant to the
provisions of the treaty, persons sought for prosecution or
convicted of an extraditable offense by the authorities in the
requesting state. Article 2 provides that an offense will be
extraditable if it is punishable under the laws in both signatories by
deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a
more severe penalty. Depending on whether Barbados has a
similar offense, the potential penalty would have to be deprivation
of liberty for a period of more than one year in order to be
extraditable.
D. Belgium
The U.S.-Belgian extradition treaty that was signed on April
27, 1987 and took effect September 1, 1997'°' provides that an
offense punishable by both parties by imprisonment or other form
of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty
will be extraditable. In addition, Article 2 provides that attempts
and conspiracies to commit these offenses, and participation in the
commission of the offenses are extraditable. Article 2 also
provides that an offense will be considered an extraditable offense
whether or not the laws of the Contracting Parties place the
offense within the same category of offenses or describe the
offense by the same terminology. Belgian counsel would need to
advise whether the tax offense for which the United States may
charge a person is a crime in Belgium and whether it is punishable
by imprisonment or another form of detention for more than one
year.
E. Bermuda
Bermuda is a dependent territory that has in force the U.S.U.K. extradition treaty, which was signed June 8, 1972 and entered
into force January 21, 1977. "" A supplementary treaty was signed
on June 25, 1985 and entered into force on December 23, 1986.
An exchange of letters on October 21, 1976 between the U.K. and
U.S. governments confirmed that the treaty applied, inter alia, to
102. Id.
103. Extradition Treaty, Apr. 27, 1987, U.S.-BeIg., S. TREATY Doc. NO. 104-7 (1987).
104. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. 12, 28 U.S.T. 227 (1976).
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Bermuda. Article 1 obligates each of the signatories to extradite
to the other, in the circumstances and subject to the conditions
specified in the treaty, any person found in its territory who has
been accused or convicted of any offense within Article 3, which
was committed within the jurisdiction of the other signatory.
Article 2 provides that extradition must be granted for an offense
within any of the descriptions listed in the schedule annexed to the
treaty. There are twenty-nine offenses listed in the schedule
including "[f]alse accounting" which may include tax fraud. The
only other listed crimes that are close to tax crimes are:
"[o]btaining property, money or valuable securities by false
pretenses or other form of deception"; and "[f]raud or false
statements by company directors and other officers." Article 3(1)
also provides that any other offense is extraditable if: "(a) the
offense is punishable under the laws of both Parties by
imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year
or by the death penalty; (b) the offense is extraditable under the
relevant law, being the law of the United Kingdom or other
territory to which this Treaty applies by virtue of sub-paragraph
(1)(a) of Article 2; and (c) the offense constitutes a felony under
the law of the United States of America."
F. Canada
Article 1 of the 1988 Protocol 5 to the 1974 Canada-U.S.
Extradition treaty1 °6 replaces Article 2 of the treaty. Article 2 had
obligated a requested state to extradite for a list of offenses, none
of which included fiscal offenses. Article 1 provides that under
new Article 2(1) a requested state must extradite for conduct that
constitutes an offense punishable by the laws of both states by
imprisonment or other form of detention for a term exceeding one
year or any greater punishment. In addition, new Article 2(2)
requires a requested state to extradite notwithstanding conduct
such as interstate transportation, use of the mails, or other
facilities affecting interstate or foreign commerce. The requested
state is also required to establish jurisdiction and form part of the
offense in the United States or "that it relates to taxation or
revenue or is one of a purely fiscal character." Hence, both
countries are obligated to extradite persons to the other country
105. Protocol Amending the Extradition Treaty with Canada, Jan. 11, 1988, U.S.-Can.,
art. 1, S. TREATY DOc. No. 101-17.
106. Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.- Can., 27 U.S.T. 983.
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for a broad number of tax cases (e.g., pure tax cases, such as cases
on income, estate, or excise, or general tax-related crimes, such as
customs, making false statements or oath in the course of filing a
return, or falsely answering inquiries of a revenue agent).
The United States and Canada have a rich relationship when
it comes to tax enforcement cooperation. The two countries have
simultaneously conduct criminal and civil audits. Revenue
authorities have regular meetings to discuss outstanding tax cases.
In a number of cases, the United States has prosecuted persons for
evading Canadian excise tax, normally on alcohol or cigarettes.
However, a split in the circuits exists as to whether the "revenue
rule,"' °7 the common law policy that one country does not enforce
a foreign country's revenue judgments, controls U.S. enforcement
of Canadian tax crimes. Indeed, Canada's excise taxes on alcohol
and tobacco products have been so comparatively high that
Canadians have bought U.S. products in order to try to defraud
the Canadian Government of tax. The incidence of evasion of
these taxes is so high in Canada that a thriving underground
economy has developed. 108
One difficulty U.S. prosecutors
experienced in Canada is the refusal of Canadian courts to accept
double hearsay as admissible evidence in extradition
proceedings. 09

G. Denmark
The U.S.-Denmark extradition treaty was signed June 22,
1972 and entered into force on July 31, 1974."0 Article 2 provides

that the requested State must, pursuant to the provisions of the
Treaty, extradite a person charged with or convicted of any offense
mentioned in Article 3 only when both of the following conditions
exist: (1) the law of the requesting State (e.g., the United States)
was in force when the offense was committed and provides a
possible penalty of deprivation of liberty for a period of more than
107. See, e.g., United States v. Pasquantino, 305 F.3d 291, (4th Cir. 2002) (overturning
wire fraud conviction because of the revenue rule); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580
(1st Cir. 1996) (reversing a similar conviction in a scheme to transport tobacco from a
Native American reservation in upstate New York). But cf. United States v. Trapilo, 130
F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997).
108. See generally Rolf Mirus & Roger S. Smith, Canada's Underground Economy:
Measurement and Implications, in THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY: GLOBAL EVIDENCE
OF ITS SIZE AND IMPACT 3 (Owen Lippert & Michael Walker eds., 1997).

109. Telephone Interview with Jim Springer, International Tax Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice (Feb. 11, 2003).
110. Extradition Treaty, June 22, 1972, U.S.-Den., art. 3(24)(c), 25 U.S.T. 1293.
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one year; and (2) the law in force in the requested state generally
provides a possible penalty of deprivation of liberty for a period of
more than one year, which would be applicable if the offense were
committed in the territory of the requested state. Article 3
provides that extradition will be granted for the following offenses:
(1) offenses relating to willful evasion of taxes and duties; (2)
offenses against the laws relating to international transfers of
funds; and (3) false statements made before a court or to a
government agency or official, including under U.S. law perjury
and subordination of perjury.
H. France
The supplementary treaty on extradition between France and
the United States, which was signed on February 12, 1970,1 states
that "(e)xtradition shall be granted, in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention, for offenses in connection with
taxes, duties, customs and exchange only if the Contracting Parties
have so decided in respect of any such offense or category of
offenses." Unless France has determined specifically that
extradition is not granted for taxes, such offenses would be
covered."2
I. Germany
The United States and Germany signed an extradition treaty
on June 20, 1978, which entered into force on August 29, 1980. " '
There is a supplementary treaty signed October 26, 1986 that
entered into force March 11, 1993. Article 1(a) of the
supplementary treaty provides that extraditable offenses are
offenses that are punishable under the laws of both contracting
parties. To determine extraditable offenses, it does not matter
whether the laws of the contracting parties place the offense within
the same category of offenses or denominate an offense by the
same terminology, or whether dual criminality follows from
Federal, State or Laender" 4 laws. In particular, dual criminality
111. Supplementary Convention to the Extradition Convention of January 6, 1909,
Feb. 12,1970, U.S.-Fr., art. VI BIS, 22 U.S.T. 407.
112. Id. The proposed French-U.S. extradition treaty signed on April 23, 1996
broadens the requirements to extradite, but the treaty is not yet in force so it will not be
discussed in this article.
113. Extradition Treaty, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 1(b), 32 U.S.T. 1485.
114. Laender is a state in the German federal system.
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may include offenses based on participation in an association
whose aims and activities include the commission of extraditable
offenses, such as a criminal society under the laws of the Federal
Republic of Germany or an association involved in racketeering or
criminal enterprise under U.S. law.
Article l(b) of the supplementary treaty amends Article 6 of
the extradition treaty as follows:
Extradition may be refused for offenses in connection with
taxes, duties, customs and exchange if the competent authority
of the Requested State determines that extradition for any such
offense would be contrary to the public policy or other essential
interests of the Requested State.
Due to the application of that provision to an extradition request,
counsel for an accused would want to obtain the advice of German
counsel experienced in extradition.
J. Greece
There is an extradition treaty between the United States and
Greece, which was signed on May 6, 1931 and entered into force
on November 1, 1932. g A protocol interpreting the treaty was
signed September 2, 1937 and entered force on the date of
signature. 6 Article 1 of the treaty permits extradition only on the
basis of offenses listed in Article 2, which does not include tax
crimes, or even making of false statements.
K. Ireland
The U.S.-Irish Treaty of 1984"17 allows extradition for fiscal
offenses. In particular, Article 2(1) makes an offense extraditable
only if it is punishable under the law of both signatories by
imprisonment for a period of more than one year, or by a more
severe penalty."' Section 13 of the Irish Extradition Act of 1965,
however, prohibits extradition for tax offenses and takes
precedence over the apparent inclusion of such offenses by the
pure dual criminality definition of extraditable offenses in the
treaty. Article 1 of the treaty states that each signatory agrees to
extradite to the other any persons, including its citizens or
115. Extradition Treaty, May 6,1931, U.S.-Greece, 47 Stat. 2185.
116. Protocol With Respect to the Interpretation of Article I of the Treaty of
Extradition of May 6, 1931, Sept. 2, 1937, U.S.-Greece, 51 Stat. 357.
117. U.S.-Ir. Extradition Treaty, supra note 57, art. 2(1).
118. Id.
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nationals, who are wanted for prosecution or for the imposition or
enforcement of a sentence in the requesting state.
L. Netherlands
The U.S.-Netherlands extradition treaty was signed on June
24, 1980 and entered into force on September 15, 1983.119 Article 1
requires the signatories to reciprocally extradite the persons
charged with those extraditable offenses listed in Article 2. Those
crimes include "offenses relating to willful evasion of taxes and
duties; . . .perjury; subornation of perjury; [and] making a false
statement to a government agency or official." In addition,
extradition offenses, whether or not listed in the appendix, are
those that are punishable under the laws of the United States and
the Netherlands.
M. Norway
The U.S.-Norwegian extradition treaty was signed on June 9,
1977 and entered into force on March 7, 1980.120 Under specified
circumstances and conditions, Article 1 obligates the signatories to
extradite to the other any person who is charged with or convicted
of any extraditable offense within Article 2. An extraditable crime
must be punishable by a possible penalty of deprivation of liberty
for a period of more than one year, or by death penalty in both the
requesting and requested countries; and must be listed in the
Schedule annexed to the treaty. The schedule includes "[o]ffenses
relating to willful evasion of taxes and duties;" "[a]n offense
against the laws relating to perjury, subornation of perjury; false
testimony"; and "[v]iolation of financial laws when such
121 violation
offense.,
enumerated
an
of
furtherance
in
is committed
N. Switzerland
According to Article 1 of the Swiss-U.S. extradition treaty, 22
the signatories agree to extradite to each other, subject to the
provisions of the treaty, persons who the competent authorities of
the requesting state have charged with or found guilty of an
extraditable offense or persons who are wanted for the carrying
119.
120.
121.
122.

Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, U.S.-Neth., S.TREATY DOC. No. 97-7.
Extradition Treaty, June 9, 1977, U.S.-Nor., 31 U.S.T. 5619.
Id.
Extradition Treaty, Nov. 14, 1990, U.S.-Switz., art. 3(3), 1990 U.S.T. LEXIS 2211.
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out of a detention order. Article 2(l) provides that an offense will
be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws of
both signatory parties by deprivation of liberty for a period
exceeding one year. Article 3(3) provides that a requested state
may deny extradition for acts that "violate provisions of law
relating exclusively to currency policy, trade policy, or economic
123
policy; [or] are intended exclusively to reduce taxes or duties.
Hence, the Swiss Government has the discretion to deny
extradition based on acts intended exclusively to reduce taxes.
The United States experienced difficulties extraditing persons
from Switzerland for tax offenses. One of the most notorious
cases was that of Marc Rich, a metals trader charged with criminal
tax violations relating to transfer pricing and manipulating oil
pricing rules. In 1984, Rich and one of his colleagues, Pincus
Green, fled to Switzerland. They received permanent residency in
Switzerland despite the felony charges and obtained citizenship
from other countries, such as Spain. On January 20, 2001, the last
day of his Presidency, President William Clinton pardoned Rich
and Green, ending their fugitive status and reigniting the
controversy and frustration over the case that had raged for
several years in the 1980s. Even after the pardon, controversy
ensued over whether Rich had successfully renounced his U.S.
citizenship. If he had not, he could be liable for taxes on income
he earned during the seventeen years he was a fugitive in
Switzerland.1 24

On January 23, 2003, the U.S. and Swiss Governments
concluded a mutual agreement that implemented Article 26 and
the exchange of information of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax
Convention. Paragraph 10 of the Protocol to the Convention
states that "tax fraud" means "fraudulent conduct that causes or is
intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the
amount of tax paid to a Contracting State., 125 The agreement
refers to an understanding that Article 26 and paragraph 10 "will
123.
124.

Id.
Bruce Zagaris, Clinton Pardons Long-Time Fugitive Marc Rich, 17 INT'L

ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 101, 102 (2001); Bruce Zagaris, Investigations of Marc Rich
Pardon Reveal More Insights on InternationalAspects, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.

149, 150 (2001).
125. Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article
26 (Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2,
1996, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/mutual.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2003). [hereinafter Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003].
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be interpreted to support the tax administration and enforcement
12 6
efforts of each contracting state to the greatest extent possible.
The agreement stated three types of conduct that would be
considered "tax fraud or the like" under Article 26 and paragraph
10. The first category is conduct that is established to defraud
individuals or companies, even though the aim of the behavior
may not be to commit tax fraud. The second category is conduct
that concerns the destruction or nonproduction of records, or the
failure to prepare or maintain correct and complete records that a
person is under a legal duty to prepare and keep for establishing
income, deductions, credits, or other information on a tax return.
The agreement characterizes that conduct as fraudulent if the
person has not properly reported such amounts on the tax return.
The third category involves: (1)the failure to file a tax return that a
person, who is subject to tax in the requesting country, is under a
legal duty to file and (2)an affirmative act that has the effect of
deceiving the tax authorities and making it difficult to uncover or
pursue the failure to file . 121
Under the agreement, examples of this conduct are
concealment of assets, covering up sources of income, or handling
business affairs to avoid making normal records. 128 Importantly,
the agreement underscored that this list is meant to be illustrative
only and does not exclude other conduct that may also be tax
fraud under Article 26, paragraph 10 of the Protocol.
In addition, the United States and Switzerland agreed to
exchange information in cases where the requesting country has a
"reasonable suspicion" of tax fraud. Those suspicions may be
based on: (1) documents, whether authenticated or not, including
but not limited to business records, books of account, or bank
account information; (2) testimonial information from a taxpayer;
(3) information obtained from an informant or other third person
that has been independently corroborated or otherwise is likely to
be credible; or (4) circumstantial evidence. The agreement stated
that these examples are simply illustrations, and not limitations. 9
In addition to the illustrative descriptions in paragraph 10 of
the Protocol, the Mutual Agreement provides fifteen hypothetical
126. Id.
127. Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, supra note 125, at para. 4a-c.
128. For a useful summary of the Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, see Alison
Bennett, U.S., Switzerland Reach Mutual Agreement On Civil, Criminal Tax Information
Exchange, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC., at GG-1 (Jan. 27, 2003).

129. Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, supra note 125, at para. 4.
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They include, inter alia,
acts that qualify for tax fraud.
concealment of embezzlement; concealment of skimmed income
through false or incomplete books and records; concealment of
bribes from corporate books and records; non-reporting of income
by a tax shelter promoter who made misrepresentations; and
aiding and abetting a specific taxpayer who has improperly
claimed deductions through a tax shelter.'30 This agreement and
the detailed hypothetical acts indicate the large number of cases
that are now included as potential tax fraud between the United
States and Switzerland."' The agreement signifies the political
commitment to cooperation on tax enforcement cooperation that
inevitably will facilitate extradition.
0. United Kingdom
The U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty was signed June 8, 1972 and
entered into force January 21, 1977. A supplementary treaty was
signed June 25, 1985 and entered into force December 23, 1986.13
Article 1 provides that each signatory undertake to extradite to the
other, in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified
in the treaty, any person found in its territory who has been
accused or convicted of any offense within Article 3, committed
within the jurisdiction of the other party. Article 3 provides that
extradition will be granted for an act or omission if the facts
disclose an offense described in the Schedule annex to the treaty
or qualifies as an offense punishable under the laws of both Parties
by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one
year. The offense is extraditable under the portion of the treaty
The offense
applicable to the U.K. dependent territories.
constitutes a felony under the laws of the United States. The list
of offenses referred to in Article 3 include: "[f]alse accounting;
[and] [firaud or false statements by company directors and other
officers." False accounting may reach tax fraud.
In sum, to the extent that the United States can persuade its
treaty partners to agree to include fiscal offenses as extraditable
offenses, future U.S. extradition treaties will include such offenses.
As other countries have started to regard fiscal offenses as
extraditable, U.S. extradition treaties increasingly include them.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at App. (hypotheticals 1-14).
Id.
Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. 12,28 U.S.T. 227 (1976), at 229.
Supplementary Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., T.I.A.S. No. 12050.
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For instance, Article 1 of the Protocol Amendment to the treaty
on extradition between Canada and the United States amended
Article 2 of the
prior treaty by making extraditable tax and other
13
fiscal offenses. 1
VII. ALTERNATIVES To EXTRADITION
In some cases, the United States can obtain custody over an
individual who it cannot extradite, by asking the country in which
the person is located to deport the individual. If the accused is a
U.S. citizen, the United States revokes his passport and informs
the country that the person is there illegally. The State
Department may revoke the passport of a U.S. citizen pursuant to
22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70 through 51.76, thereby depriving the
fugitive/extraditee of a travel document and making it difficult for
such person to travel or even remain abroad. The United States
can revoke a passport if the person has an outstanding federal
arrest warrant for the commission of a felony. 13' The State
Department can also revoke a passport if the person is subject to a
criminal court order, condition of probation, or condition of parole
prohibiting
him from
departing the United States under threat of
136
..
arrest. Revocation may also occur if the person is the subject of
an extradition request or provisional arrest for extradition that has
been presented to the requested state.137 The State Department
can also revoke a passport if the person is subject to imprisonment
or supervised release due to a conviction for a federal or state
felony drug offense and the person used a passport or otherwise
crossed an international border in committing the offense.""
Deportation laws in some countries provide efficient means of
deportation. If a person has not entered a foreign country
properly, a person often has few rights. If such a person is
deported, the United States will then be able to try or punish that
person. The returned person also has no right to protection from
the rule of specialty, unless the requested state obtains a written

134. Protocol Amending the Extradition Treaty with Canada, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can.,
art. 1, S. TREATY DOc. No. 101-17 (as amended by an Exchange of Notes on June 28 and
July 9, 1974).
135. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70(a)(1), 51.72(a) (2002).
136. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70(a)(2), 51.72(a) (2002).
137. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70(a)(4), 51.72(a) (2002).
138. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.71(a), 51.72(a) (2002).
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promise39 from the United States that the rule of specialty will
apply.
Sometimes the fugitive/extraditee can avoid deportation if the
fugitive enters the requested state on the basis of a valid passport
other than a U.S. passport or at least if the fugitive has a valid nonU.S. passport, especially a passport of the requested state. In this
regard, many countries offer citizenship to persons whose parents
or grandparents were citizens. Other countries offer economic
nationality, whereby an individual can acquire nationality by
making a substantial investment. 4°
For example, if the accused is a bona fide Irish citizen, it
would be legally and diplomatically difficult for Ireland to revoke
the citizenship, assuming the citizenship was properly obtained.
Revoking citizenship without substantive reasons would denigrate
the value of citizenship. Revocation of a residency permit, or
more importantly citizenship, is not often viewed as an alternative
to extradition. When it occurs, the case should be important,
especially since Ireland is a country in which the rule of law is
important. It should also be a case where the fugitive/extraditee is
a person with no standing in Ireland and his offense makes him
easily disposable. There is a very small chance that the United
States could make a successful request since the United States has
a lot of political leverage with Ireland.
Another alternative to extradition is kidnapping, either by
force... or by luring. 142 The former is rarely employed and
permission from high level officials in the U.S. Department of
Justice in Washington, D.C. must be obtained. Luring is
occasionally used. It happens when the U.S. government, through
use of a subterfuge, attracts an extraditee to enter a country where
the United States can arrest him. Because of the sensitivity of
139. ABBELL, supra note
RESOURCE MANUAL § 610.

12, at 372-73; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, CRIMINAL

140. For background on obtaining economic nationality, see for example, MARSHALL
J. LANGER, THE TAX EXILE REPORT: CITIZENSHIP, SECOND PASSPORTS AND ESCAPING
CONFISCATORY TAXES (2d ed. 1993-94); MARSHALL J. LANGER, CHOOSE GRENADA
FOR YOUR SECOND CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT (2000). In 2002, many of the economic

nationality programs were cancelled or suspended due to abuse of the programs and
illegal use of nationality and passports.
141. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
142. For instances of legal luring, see for example, United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d
1086, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 971-72 (4th Cir.
1983); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1981); United States ex reL
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
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abducting defendants outside the United States (by government
agents or the use of private persons, like bounty hunters or private
investigators), prosecutors must have advance approval by the
OIA before using such tactics. 143 Because some countries may
perceive the lure of a person from its territory an infringement on
its sovereignty and thus, will not extradite that person, a
prosecutor must consult with the OIA before undertaking a lure to
the United States or a third country.' 44 On rare occasions, a
sovereignty that was offended by a kidnapping or a lure persuaded
the United States to return the person to the country and then
seek the extradition of the person.
VIII. TRENDS
Recent cases indicate that the United States has successfully
extradited several persons for tax offenses. Recently, in response
to a Danish extradition request, the United States detained and
denied bail in connection with a Danish national and charismatic
cult leader charged with tax fraud in Denmark. 146 The evolution of
traditional reluctance to extradite for tax offenses (e.g., the
''revenue rule") to the current position of increased willingness to
extradite for such offenses, at least with respect to some requesting
states, is illustrated by the Dutch position. The Netherlands is one
of the most sophisticated countries in terms of both international
law and international tax cooperation, in part because of its
respect for international law, its longstanding hosting of
international courts, and its history both as a mercantile country
and as an international financial services center. The country's
Extradition Act prohibits extradition for tax offenses, unless
143. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 9-15.610,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousalfoia-reading__room/usamtitle9/15mcrm.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
144. Id. at § 9-15.630.
145. See United States v. Hills, 765 F. Supp. 381, 383 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (finding
that Canadian authorities released an alleged robber of a Windsor, Canada bank on the
U.S. side of Windsor-Detroit tunnel after hot pursuit); Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862, 870
(4th Cir. 1931) (stating that American authorities released an alleged drug dealer to
Canada); see also Howard Kurtz, For U.S. Bounty Hunters, National BoundariesAre Little
or No Constraint, WASH. POST, May 15, 1987, at A23 (reporting that a Canadian man
illegally detained by American bounty hunters in Canada was later released to Texan
authorities by Canadian authorities); 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 345 (1942). The United States has occasionally sought and obtained the return of a
person abducted from the United States by foreign law enforcement officials.
146. Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Arrest and Deny Bail to Alleged Fraudster on Danish
Extradition Warrant, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 142, 142-43 (Apr. 2002).
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treaties specifically so provide."' The Extradition Act does not
define a tax offense. One commentator believes it has the same
meaning as the provisions of Article 5 of the 1957 European
Convention on Extradition, upon which the Act was based.' 4 The
Dutch Extradition Act covers "offenses in connection with taxes,
duties, customs and exchange," that is, offenses punishable by tax
law. 149 Case law does include crimes committed for the purpose of
evading an obligation to pay taxes as tax offenses. "" The Dutch
Extradition Act is even more restrictive than its counterpart
provisions in Article 5 of the European Convention on Extradition
since the former does not include offenses "connected with" tax
crimes. To determine whether an offense constitutes a tax offense,
Dutch courts will consider the nature of the obligation imposed by
a criminal provision, as opposed to the name of the Act
incorporating the provision.
The Dutch Government has concluded several extradition
treaties that provide for extradition for tax offenses, namely with
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, and the United States. Hence, the
Dutch Government shows a willingness to extradite for tax
offenses, both in bilateral and multilateral treaties. In this regard,
while the provisions of Article 5 of the European Convention on
Extradition except extradition for tax offenses, the Dutch have
joined the Convention's 1978 Second Additional Protocol
eliminating the exception. Germany has also become a party to
the Protocol, so it has an extradition obligation for tax offenses.
Since these countries are neighbors and members of the EU, they
engage in substantial inter-state economic activities.
The 1962 Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters"' excludes extradition for tax
offenses unless the signatories expressly provide for it through

147. Extradition Act-Act of 9 March 1967, Staatsblad 139, (containing new regulations
relating to extradition and other forms of international assistance in criminal matters), as
last amended by the Act of 12 April 2995, Staatsblad254, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW INTHE NETHERLANDS (Bert Swart & Andr6 Klip eds., 1997), at app., art. 11, para. 4.
148. Coen Mulder, Cooperation in Tax Matters, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
IN THE NETHERLANDS, 231, 234 (1997).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Treaty Concerning Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June
27, 1962. Beig.-Lux.-Neth., 616 U.N.T.S. 79, http://ue.eu.int/ejn/data/vol-c/9_autres-textes/
traite d-extraditionen.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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special arrangements. However, the signatories have not yet made
such arrangements.53

Another trend is to include tax crimes in international
criminal cooperation agreements. For instance, Article 1 of the
Optional Protocol related to the Inter-American Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1 4 provides that the
signatories to the Protocol shall not refuse a request for assistance
solely on the ground that the request concerns a tax crime in any
case in which the request is from another state party to this
Protocol. Article 2 provides that parties to this Protocol, when
acting as a requested state under the Convention, shall not decline
assistance, which requires the measures, referred to in Article 5 of
the Convention, if the act specified in the request corresponds to a
tax crime of the same nature under the laws of the requested
state. 155 The Protocol is already in effect between Ecuador and the
United States.
In certain cases, the United States, as the requesting state,
may experience difficulty, especially with respect to European
countries and countries sensitive to arguments under international
human rights. For example, extradition may be difficult when
arguments are raised about the potentially inhumane sentences
and/or practical inoperability of the prisoner transfer treaties. The
latter becomes important with respect to a requested state whose
constitution prohibits extradition for nationals and where the
extradition treaty allows for extradition based on the expectation
that the accused national of the requested state will be able to
serve his sentence in the requested state. In some cases where the
accused cannot practically take advantage of the prisoner transfer
treaty due to a short sentence and the comparatively long time
normally required for a transfer to occur, the requested state's
court may be reluctant to extradite, especially if the accused can
raise other colorable arguments.
The above-mentioned January 23, 2003 Agreement between
the United States and Switzerland regarding the implementation
of the exchange of information also indicates the determination of
these two countries to extend international tax cooperation.
153. Mulder, supra note 148, at 235.
154. Optional Protocol Related to the Inter-American Convention on the Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 11, 1993, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
treaties/A-59.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
155. Id. at art. 2.
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Switzerland is a key country for the U.S. government's efforts at
international enforcement of tax matters because it is a recipient
of many worldwide deposits based on its longstanding rules of
confidentiality.
IX. CONCLUSION
The evolution of traditional reluctance to extradite for tax
offenses (i.e., the "revenue rule") to the current position of
increased willingness to extradite for such offenses, at least with
respect to some requesting states, is illustrated by several
developments. A number of countries, such as the Netherlands,
have obligated themselves to extradite for tax offenses through
concluding bilateral and multilateral treaties (or protocols).
Crimes involving tax fraud offer the best chance to compel
extradition for tax offenses. In some extradition treaties, coverage
may include tax offenses and offenses "connected with" tax
offenses. Offenses that may be connected with tax offenses
include false statements, obstruction of justice, CCE violations,
RICO violations, wire fraud, mail fraud, and similar offenses.
Since the 1980s, a number of treaties and/or executive agreements
that deal with international tax enforcement cooperation,
particularly tax information exchange agreements have emerged.
Similarly, many treaties of mutual assistance in criminal matters
(MLATs) cover tax offenses. In fact, the United States has
conditioned some of its tax treaties with countries with important
financial service sectors (e.g., Austria and Luxembourg) on
concluding MLATs covering tax offenses.
In applying extradition with respect to tax offenses, interested
persons must pay careful attention to the substantive law of the
requested state with respect to tax offenses, extradition law,
constitutional law, criminal law and procedure, and public
international law.
There are a few countries whose treaties do not specifically
cover tax charges (e.g., Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal) or
treat extradition for such offenses as only discretionary (e.g.,
Germany and Switzerland). It also appears that, notwithstanding
the obligation to extradite under the treaty, Irish law may possibly
override their extradition treaty with the United States and
prevent extradition.
The trend is for modern treaties to
specifically require extradition for tax crimes and related offenses.
In addition, the current international environment is conducive for
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governments to extend general and specific international tax
cooperation on extradition for tax crimes. As a result, prospects
for the U.S. government's success in extradition for tax crimes are
becoming more favorable.

